Understanding and responding when things go wrong: key principles for primary care educators by McNab, Duncan et al.
  
 
 
 
 
McNab, D., Bowie, P., Ross, A., and Morrison, J. (2016) Understanding and 
responding when things go wrong: key principles for primary care educators. 
Education for Primary Care, 27(4), pp. 258-266. 
   
There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are 
advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/121728/ 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposited on: 10 August 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
1 
 
 
 
Understanding and responding when things go wrong:  
key principles for primary care educators 
Dr Duncan McNab 
GP Associate Adviser (Safety and Improvement)1 and PhD Student2 
Dr Paul Bowie1, 2 
Programme Director1 and Honorary Senior Lecturer1 
Dr Alastair Ross3, 4 
Lecturer in Behavioural Science3 and Human Factors lead4 
Prof Jill Morrison 
Professor of General Practice and Primary Care2 
1Medical Directorate, NHS Education for Scotland, Glasgow, UK 
2Institute of Health and Wellbeing, University of Glasgow, UK 
3Dental School, Glasgow University, UK 
4Centre for Applied Resilience in Healthcare, St Thomas Hospital, London, UK 
 
 
Corresponding author: 
Dr D McNab 
Associate Adviser (Safety and Improvement) 
Medical Directorate 
NHS Education for Scotland 
2 Central Quay 
GLASGOW, Scotland, UK 
G3 8BW 
Email: duncan.mcnab@nes.scot.nhs.uk 
Telephone: 0141 223 1450 
 
  
2 
 
ABSTRACT 
Learning from events with unwanted outcomes is an important part of workplace based education 
and providing evidence for medical appraisal and revalidation. It has been suggested that adopting a 
‘systems approach’ could enhance learning and effective change. We believe the following key 
principles should be understood by all healthcare staff, especially those with a role in developing and 
delivering educational content for safety and improvement in primary care. 
When things go wrong, professional accountability involves accepting there has been a problem, 
apologising if necessary and committing to learn and change. This is easier in a ‘Just Culture’ where 
wilful disregard of safe practice is not tolerated but where decisions commensurate with training 
and experience do not result in blame and punishment. People usually attempt to achieve successful 
outcomes, but when things go wrong the contribution of hindsight and attribution bias as well as a 
lack of understanding of conditions and available information (local rationality) can lead to 
inappropriately blame ‘human error’. System complexity makes reduction into component parts 
difficult; thus attempting to ‘find-and-fix’ malfunctioning components may not always be a valid 
approach. Finally, performance variability by staff is often needed to meet demands or cope with 
resource constraints.  
We believe understanding these core principles is a necessary precursor to adopting a ‘systems 
approach’ that can increase learning and reduce the damaging effects on morale when ‘human 
error’ is blamed.  This may result in ‘human error’ becoming the starting point of an investigation 
and not the endpoint.  
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Introduction 
When things go wrong in many aspects of everyday life ‘human error’ is often cited as the ‘cause’. 
This is true in highly hazardous industries, including healthcare, where media headlines are often 
quick to blame human error as the ‘cause’ of any safety-related incidents or accidents.  It is often 
presumed that if there has been no technical malfunction, or natural disaster, then the human must 
have caused the accident.  
In 2000, the seminal report, An Organisation with a Memory, was published by the Department of 
Health. [1] Central to the report’s key recommendations was that we should move away from 
blaming individual human error as a primary ‘cause’ of adverse healthcare events (events that 
resulted in preventable harm to patients) and adopt a ‘systems view’ when investigating these types 
of incidents.  More than a decade on, this move towards a new way of thinking and acting has 
proved challenging and progress remains slow – particularly in updating and integrating related 
curricula to support education and training of the NHS workforce.  
As one way of taking this agenda forward, and consolidating the need for a fundamental 
understanding of the factors that give rise to healthcare outcomes, good and bad, we firstly propose 
a basic ‘package’ of ideas and concepts that need to be grasped (and arguably ‘believed’) by 
clinicians, managers, senior executives, educators, regulators and policymakers before significant 
progress can be made in improving the quality and safety of patient care.  In this article, we argue 
that it is imperative that those involved in patient safety education in primary healthcare accept and 
adopt the key fundamental principles outlined to aid this progress. [Box 1]  
Involvement in patient safety work and education 
Like all clinicians, the core work of qualified GPs and specialty trainees is obviously focused on 
improving the health and wellbeing of patients, while simultaneously keeping them safe from 
avoidable harm associated with clinical interventions and care processes.  However, sometimes 
things do go wrong and when this happens the GP team is expected to act accordingly, often 
undertaking Significant Event Analyses (SEA) to investigate such patient safety incidents (events 
where patients suffered unintentional but preventable harm or had the potential to do so, as part of 
their healthcare management, whether physical or psychological and no matter how minor). [2] SEA 
is assumed to help teams a) understand why the event happened and b) implement change to 
minimise the risks of recurrence. In the UK, completion of written SEA reports is a mandated 
component of workplace based assessment for general practice specialty trainees. [3] Similarly, it is 
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also a requirement for qualified GPs as part of the appraisal and revalidation process. [4], and is 
sometimes incentivised locally by health authorities.  
Whilst reflecting on (and learning from) patient safety incidents is considered a key part of 
professional development and improving the quality and safety of care, it has been suggested that 
both learning and improvement could be more objective, meaningful and effective, if we move away 
from focusing on individual human error (and its potential corollary – ‘blame’). The evidence 
suggests many do not give sufficient attention to broader systems influences, but overly focus on 
individual performance and behaviours without appreciating the wider human interactions and work 
environment factors that combine and impact to contribute to safety incidents.  A recent review 
demonstrated that ‘human error’ was the most commonly cited contributing factor in SEAs 
conducted by GP teams, being attributed to around a third of all events analysed [5].   
When things go wrong – Balancing Safety and Accountability in a ‘Just Culture’ 
To those of us working in patient safety education and research in primary care, it often seems that 
‘accountability’ can be misunderstood by clinicians and managers in the context of something going 
wrong.  Frequently it appears to take on punitive overtones, and may be associated with finding 
someone to blame (or self-blame). Where this organisational or team ‘blame culture’ is prevalent 
learning and change is not maximised (and future opportunities for learning are diminished when 
others see the consequences).  
In reality, individual professional accountability actually involves accepting that there has been an 
error, raising the issue, apologising to those concerned, and committing to learn and implement any 
necessary change.  Thus moving from a ‘blame culture’ to an ‘open’ or ‘just’ culture. This does not 
mean some unsafe acts do not deserve sanctions. But the culture is that people (patients, families, 
clinicians and managers) want openness, transparency, and fairness. Being accountable 
(professionally and organisationally) rather than indulging in the ‘blame-game’, therefore, is an 
important precursor to analysing and learning from adverse events. In this way ‘human error’ often 
becomes the starting point of the analysis of a significant event rather than the end point. 
If the idea is for GPs and speciality trainees to learn from patient safety incidents to make healthcare 
safer then it seems self-evident that we need to move from a narrow focus on what people did and 
did not do, to a wider one which takes into account the demands of the situation, the often limited 
resources at their disposal, what they were trying to achieve and why, what other people have 
suggested in that area of operation, etc. People will generally accept being held accountable for 
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their actions, and commit to learning and improving, if they know that all the various influences on 
outcomes will be genuinely taken into account.  This ‘Just Culture’ has been defined as: 
"...a culture in which front-line operators and others are not punished for actions, omissions or 
decisions taken by them which are commensurate with their experience and training, but where 
gross negligence, wilful violations and destructive acts are not tolerated. [6] 
The development of such a Just Culture requires commitment of all levels of the organisation: GPs, 
managers and the whole team. Staff training that commences at induction (including speciality 
trainee induction) is essential and should enshrine the four key principles related to situations where 
something goes wrong: to report, disclose, protect and learn. [7; Box 2] The involvement of frontline 
clinical and administrative staff in the analyses of incidents and the development and continued 
success of a Just Culture is vital. They are the experts in how everyday work is actually conducted 
and can help managers and other staff involved in the analysis understand local system contexts, 
demands and constraints which influenced why decisions were made.  
A properly functioning Just Culture requires as many differing perspectives as possible to be brought 
to bear on an event or process under scrutiny. The ‘view from below’ (often coming from those 
directly involved in events) is as vital as the ‘view from above’ from those involved in the 
management and clinical governance of practices or organisations. In a functioning Just Culture 
frontline staff will feel able to explain the conditions of work that led to decisions being made, and 
such accounts should always be solicited prior to analysis of incidents. These accounts should not be 
used to search for protocol violation and assign blame but to try to understand the dynamic 
interactions and variations that characterise healthcare work systems. Decisions in context are very 
different from those that might be desirable under ‘ideal’ or sterile conditions. This field of inquiry, 
trying to understand actions on the ground in context, is known as the examination of ‘cognition in 
the wild’ [8].  
In summary, it is vital to a) adopt a systems perspective which minimises the focus on discrete 
individual behaviours and discourages the propensity to blame; b) examine actions in contexts which 
are often complex and require difficult weighing up of options and goals; and c) hold people 
accountable in an open and transparent fashion whilst promoting and maintaining a shared goal of 
system improvement (amongst  care teams, organisations, accreditation and regulatory bodies) for 
the benefit of staff and patients alike. 
 
Incident Analysis - The problem with ‘human error’ and human biases 
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As stated, if there is no obvious technical, mechanical or organisational problem then ‘human error’ 
is often cited as the cause of an incident or accident [9]. There are well documented reasons for this 
focus on the proximal, active precursors to accidents, in fact such a general bias towards human 
actions (ignoring system and environmental influences such as protocols, cultures, interdisciplinary 
boundaries etc.) is known in behavioural science terms as the ‘Fundamental Attribution Error’ [10].   
Further, hindsight bias applies because the label ‘error’ is almost always attached once we know the 
outcome, and this fundamentally affects how we subsequently analyse events. It is easy to analyse 
significant events and work backwards until someone is found who deviated from protocol or forgot 
to do something and blame that individual or team for causing the event. It is also easy to assume, in 
hindsight, that this deviation is the error that caused the adverse event and that this outcome was 
predictable. However, such judgements are always made after the event with full knowledge of the 
outcome. In the complex systems that exist in healthcare where the conditions that influence work 
contexts and interactions are not always immediately visible or fully understood, it is difficult to be 
sure that a) deviation from protocol resulted in the adverse event or b) the event would not have 
occurred if a different course of action had been taken [11]. 
Analysing events retrospectively can also lead to influence from other human biases. If the event 
outcome was considered ‘bad’ then it is presumed that the ‘cause’ is equally bad. If the unwanted 
effect was minor, a simple cause may be promoted; whereas if it was more serious a more complex 
explanation may be sought. It is easy to ascribe causes to events that were closer in space and time 
to the unwanted event or to people who are more memorable to those involved.  This principle of 
the ‘salience’ of possible explanations may result in the blaming of frontline workers who are visible 
and present in the vicinity of patients prior to an event that caused harm. [12] 
As McKay et al (2009) found, GPs are often ready to ‘take the blame’ when something goes wrong. 
[5] This is often due to these inherent biases. For example, often the last person to see a patient 
before some serious event ‘takes the blame’. Consider this scenario: a patient with depression sees 
several GPs over the course of a year. Shortly after seeing one doctor he commits suicide. This 
doctor may ‘take the blame’ and review his/her own actions and conclude that in retrospect there 
were a lot of risk factors for suicide and they should have predicted this and acted accordingly 
(hindsight bias). Family may also be ready to blame the doctor as they were the last person to see 
them (this face-to-face interaction, close in time to the outcome, is therefore highly salient). As the 
outcome was so ‘bad’ the actions or inactions of the GP, no matter what they were, will be viewed 
as ‘wrong’- how can they not be so, when the patient sadly came to harm? One can imagine that 
recommendations might include training in suicide awareness and/or consultation skills, or a review 
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of the management of patients with mental health problems to improve the performance of the GP 
(and the wider care team). However, the complexity of dealing with several problems during a ten-
minute consultation is less likely to be fully considered, nor the fact that appropriate referral and 
safety netting (with family involvement) had actually taken place. Continuity within the practice, the 
ability to book longer appointments and the interface with colleagues in mental health services, are 
also less attractive (though no less plausible) as explanations for such events but may not be 
considered, especially where emotions run high.  
Despite the rhetoric of the move towards a ‘Just Culture’ in the NHS, many organisations (and SEA 
attempts) still see blaming ‘human error’ (either directly or indirectly) as an easy ‘fix’. If an 
investigation concludes that one person or team is to blame for a particular adverse event, then it 
seems easy to ‘fix’ the problem. Re-training, more education, increased control of work processes, 
unwarranted disciplinary action or even dismissal are seen as straightforward ways to sort the 
problem. Reports can be produced that detail the cause of the event and the actions that have been 
implemented to prevent it re-occurring. This may appease organisations, regulators, media and the 
public, but may not solve the underlying problem and so learning is limited and recurrence remains 
likely.   
Local rationality 
When investigating events, we not only know the outcome but we have access to other information 
that would not be available to those involved in the incident. Psychologists suggest that decisions 
are made to achieve success based on the information that is available to the frontline worker at the 
time. This is termed local rationality. When analysing events retrospectively it is tempting to 
presume that all the information available to the investigators was available to those who made the 
‘error’. Exploring the decisions other staff with similar experience would have made in similar 
situations can be helpful but this is still influenced by hindsight bias. [13]  
Viewed from this perspective, the presence of a ‘blame culture’ and the focus on ‘human error’ are 
counterproductive to learning and improvement. The care team and the practice’s ability to learn 
from adverse events and from near misses is reduced. Incidents are not reported or raised because 
front line workers know they will be judged not by their very real and well intentioned attempts at 
the time in uncertain conditions, but by the standard of what they ‘should’ have done based on a 
knowledge of outcomes that have now crystallized.  
Understanding everyday work - System complexity and performance variability 
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The application of a ‘systems approach’ is considered essential to improving patient safety efforts [1] 
and is a goal in the application of Human factors/Ergonomics (HFE) approaches in the workplace. 
[14] Initially it requires definition of the work systems and understanding of the complex interactions 
and context within which work is undertaken. Systems are often broken down into their component 
parts in an attempt to understand functioning, but a holistic view of system functioning 
encompassing the varied interactions between components is a core HFE principle.  
So, what do we mean by a ‘system’ and by ‘complexity’?  At the outset, it is important to understand 
what these terms actually mean. A system can be described as: 
“A set of elements or parts that is coherently organized and interconnected in a pattern or structure 
that produces a characteristic set of behaviours, often classified as its ‘function’ or ‘purpose’” [15]  
An example of a GP prescribing system is described in Box 3. A process is similar but involves the 
activities involved rather than the components and can be defined as: 
“A systematic series of actions directed to the achievement of a goal.” [16] 
Parts of the system may be obvious (for example the computer that prints prescriptions) but other 
parts are less obvious (for example the dialogue between the patient and doctor before the 
prescription is printed). It is tempting to imagine the everyday systems that we work within 
operating in a logical, linear manner but this is rarely the case in healthcare. Although the described 
prescribing system appears to progress in a logical, stepwise, chronologically simple fashion, in 
reality many feedback loops are present such as discussion between the GP, the administrative staff, 
the patient and the pharmacist before prescriptions are signed. Also, healthcare systems do not 
function in isolation rather they work within other systems and are influenced by ever changing 
conditions with poorly defined boundaries.  
This has led to healthcare systems being described as ‘complex socio-technical systems’, 
characterised by multiple interactions between various components, both human and technological.  
[17, 18, 19] Decisions may need to be made with imprecise information and actions may need to 
vary dependent on conditions to ensure successful and safe outcomes.  For example, clinicians may 
elect to continue medication while awaiting monitoring test results in order to ensure no harm 
comes to the patient. The conditions in the system can change rapidly. Demand may increase due to 
holidays or due to media reports relating to medication warnings. Capacity can change due to staff 
absence, guidelines can change and importantly the wishes, the understanding and the health of 
patients can change and influence how we complete prescriptions. Due to this variability clinicians 
and administrative staff constantly adjust their performance and often stray from standard practice 
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or protocol in an attempt to match the demand. These adjustments may be seen as ‘violations’ 
when viewed retrospectively but they are essential, ubiquitous and usually result in successful 
outcomes. However, adjustments are approximate and so also result in unsuccessful outcomes. 
Trade-offs are another vital part of working in complex systems. One of the most recognised trade-
offs is the efficiency-thoroughness-trade-off. This entails sacrificing task thoroughness for efficiency. 
An example would be signing large numbers of prescriptions every day. The thorough (or safer) 
action would be to review the notes of many patients and arrange telephone or surgery review for 
many others; the efficient action is to sign them (otherwise other necessary care work is 
compromised). Performance variability and trade-offs are essential for successful operation in 
complex systems; they are everyday work. In the real world of work, performance variability, 
multiple interactions and environmental influences result in systems that are difficult to fully specify, 
break down into their component parts and comprehensively understand – therefore ‘cause and 
effect’ become less obviously related. [20]. 
Accident models – The problem with ‘root cause’ and linear thinking 
Various conceptual models have been used in patient safety to aid analysis of incidents. Heinrich’s 
domino model suggests a simple linear relationship between cause and effect that allows an 
investigator to work backwards from the incident and find the upstream cause. The model is rarely 
valid in the complex systems in healthcare. [21; Figure 1] Reason’s ‘Swiss Cheese’ model describes 
how a combination of latent errors may allow active errors to cause accidents. [13; Figure 2] 
Although this model has been successful in moving focus from a single cause it has been criticised 
due to the fact it does not recognise the multiple interactions between components and barriers, it 
displays barriers being violated in a linear manner and can still lead to the blaming of those 
responsible for active or latent errors. [22, 23] 
Using these conceptual models, traditional incident investigation techniques have worked 
backwards from events to find the ‘root causes’. Changes are then made to improve the functioning 
of this component, thus expecting the system as a whole to improve. This ‘find and fix’ approach 
often results in events reoccurring. [24] Maximising the performance of each component in the 
system is not guaranteed to increase the overall performance of the system. If a systems approach is 
adopted, performance of components is optimised (not necessarily maximised) to enhance system 
performance. For example, in the prescribing system described there may be many different 
interactions between various people and different technologies. Maximising one part, for example 
how requests are received (through email or telephone), may not improve overall system 
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functioning and indeed may reduce functioning as the timing of demand may change and affect flow 
of work.  
Moving forward – a systems approach 
Whole hearted adoption of these core principles at an individual and organisation level is necessary 
if our practice of incident investigation, and indeed all patient safety improvement work, is to 
mature towards a systems approach. There are many complicated methods available to help teams 
take a systems approach – but you do not need to be an expert in systems thinking to move towards 
a systems ideology. [25]  
A systems approach involves three main principles: 
• The first is attempting to understand the interactions and relationships between 
components and how these contributed to the incident or accident. Change is implemented 
by considering these interactions in an attempt to improve the overall performance of the 
system.  
• The second principle is the use of multiple perspectives. Systems functioning and 
relationships between components appear different to different people; indeed interactions 
change frequently. The administrative member of staff will have a different view on how the 
system actually works compared to the patient, the pharmacist or the GP. The protocol may 
have been written by a manager or GP and may not reflect how it really works. Frontline 
staff should be involved in incident investigation but also in protocol design – they are the 
experts in everyday work. 
• The third principle is defining boundaries. Systems are subjected to many influences and it is 
not possible to consider all of these, therefore some sort of boundary needs to be agreed. 
Often in general practice, the boundary is defined as the practice building although can 
often involve allied health professionals, pharmacies, social work and secondary care. When 
adopting a systems approach, an agreement on boundaries needs to be made on a case by 
case basis in order to maximise learning. All functions that are essential for the overall 
purpose of the system under investigation should be included within the boundary. If the 
practice wishes to only examine their own part of the prescribing system, then the boundary 
is set as the patient and the practice but if the role of the pharmacy was important in an 
incident then the boundary needs to include the pharmacy.  
Various conceptual models are available to aid the adoption of a systems approach. The scientific 
discipline of Human Factors/Ergonomics has recently developed the SEIPS 2.0 model. [26; Figure 3] 
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This is based on a combination of the workplace being illustrated as a socio-technical system and 
Donabedian’s structure, process and outcome model but shows how various components can 
interact in healthcare systems and impact on performance and well-being. Moray’s Onion model 
(see previous article by Bowie and Jeffcott) similarly shows the various layers involved in the system. 
[27, 28] Enhanced SEA employs a simplified model that directs investigators to consider the 
interactions between people, the activities they are performing and the environment in which they 
are performing them. [29] A recently published white paper from the air traffic control industry 
entitled ‘Systems Thinking for Safety: Ten principles’ describes ten principles that can be used to aid 
understanding of systems. [6; Box 4] These principles may help those working in healthcare to 
understand and apply a systems approach. It is not clear if these principles can be applied to 
everyday general practice, or wider healthcare, but many of the themes have been considered in 
this paper. Further research into their development and application in primary care is underway. 
Conclusions 
At a fundamental level, progress on improving the quality and safety of patient care and related 
education and training will always be hampered if the workforce does not have a basic 
understanding of how outcomes emerge. A move from searching for simple ‘root causes’ such as 
human error to accepting multiplicity of cause is vital to maximise learning from investigating patient 
safety incidents. Educators should understand that frontline staff need to be involved in all quality 
and safety efforts to ensure that multiple perspectives are considered. This is only achievable if they 
feel safe to do so, and the adoption of a Just Culture that encourages accountability rather than 
blame is embedded.  Frontline staff also can explain local rationality and why performance variability 
is essential to ensure successful system functioning.  An understanding of the interacting complexity 
of healthcare systems will aid the primary care workforce and clinical educators in adopting these 
principles.  
To maximise learning and change from investigating patient safety incidents these principles need to 
be understood, accepted and implemented by all involved in moving the safety agenda forward, but 
most importantly by frontline practitioners and those responsible for their education and training. 
They need also to be fully embraced and believed by clinical leaders, senior managers, policymakers 
and regulators to ensure that staff are supported in endeavouring to move from the ‘easy fix’ of 
blaming individual actions taken out of context, or simple protocol violations, to a more complex but 
more rewarding description of system performance.  They act as the necessary building blocks to 
allow this approach to not only improve system understanding, but also help to improve personal 
wellbeing, team morale, increase learning and make change more effective.  
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For this to be consistently achieved these foundational ‘first principles’ need to be incorporated into 
all levels of patient safety education for primary healthcare staff, including specialty trainees. The 
inclusion within the training curriculum may be an important lever for change and for the 
development of related educational resources to support trainers.  Arguably, it is only once these 
core principles are embedded into the everyday routines of primary care organisations can the true 
potential of a systems approach to patient safety (and quality improvement) begin to be fully 
realised. [Box 1] 
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Boxes and figures 
Box 1 - Key patient safety principles 
Key patient safety principles 
Accountability  
 
Accept that there has been an error, apologise if 
necessary and commit, as an individual and as an 
organisation, to learn and implement necessary 
change.  
Just culture When responding to patient safety incidents, 
decisions that are commensurate with training 
and level of experience will not be punished. 
Human error ‘Human error’ should be the starting point of an 
investigation and not the end of an investigation. 
Hindsight and attribution bias We are all influenced by biases that affect how 
we view incidents and the decisions made. These 
need to be acknowledged and considered when 
investigating events. 
Local rationality People make decisions with the aim of achieving 
success that make sense to them based on the 
information they have available at the time. 
System complexity  Systems in healthcare are rarely linear but have 
multiple complex interactions. Rather than 
reducing systems to individual components in an 
attempt to find and fix faulty components a 
holistic view of system functioning is required.  
Performance variability In complex systems workers have to vary their 
actions in order to achieve successful outcomes. 
These variations should not be viewed as 
violations and lead to blame but should be 
explored and understood as they are 
fundamental to successful functioning of 
complex systems: they are everyday work. 
 
Box 2 – The four key principles of a Just Culture  
Just Culture 
Report 
Staff should be encouraged to report adverse events and near misses to allow learning from these 
events through easily accessible reporting systems. Anxiety for staff that report should be minimised 
by detailing what will happen to their report, who will see it and what are the consequences of 
reporting? 
Disclose 
Disclosure involves discussing reports with patients. Disclosure can demonstrate that the practice 
has taken the event seriously and that change has been implemented to reduce the risk of 
14 
 
recurrence. Disclosure can also reduce the risk of complaint and litigation. Disclosure is 
recommended by the GMC when there has been patient harm and Duty of Candour legislation is 
being developed to ensure consistent implementation.  
Protect 
Staff that report or disclose need to be protected and written policies to define this are required. 
Learn 
Staff need to receive feedback and see change in order to believe that the reporting system is 
functioning and worth continued engagement.  
Feedback can be local and be at the individual or team level. This may lead to immediate change. 
Alternatively, a number of incidents may be themed leading to more organisational learning and 
change may take longer.  Lastly, reported incidents may be useful in the wider context and shared 
between practices. It can be useful for teams to revisit previous investigations of adverse events in 
order to demonstrate the changes that were implemented.  
The use of a systems based model can improve the learning from events. 
 
Box 3 - Example of a system -The prescribing system within the GP practice.  
This system may involve patients phoning a prescription telephone line and informing a member of 
the administrative staff which medications they need. This is printed and given to the GP to sign. It is 
then put in a box at reception for collection by a driver from the pharmacy. This system can be 
divided further: 
• A microsystem may be the discussion between the patient and the member of the 
administrative staff, or printing of the prescription etc. 
• A mesosystem is composed of more than one microsystem and so may be the system within 
the boundaries of the GP surgery. 
• The macrosystem may include not just the GP surgery but also the pharmacy and could be 
extrapolated to include other practice systems such as appointment booking or other 
systems relating to prescribing such as health board prescribing advisers, national regulators 
etc 
 
 
Box 4 - Systems Thinking for Safety: Ten principles 
System thinking 
for safety 
principle 
Potential application to healthcare Example in Primary Care 
A patient telephones for a 
prescription but the wrong one is 
printed by the admin member of 
staff.  
Foundation 
principle – system 
focus 
Consider safety in the context of the 
system and not isolated individuals. 
Consider the boundaries of the system to 
be investigated, identify all those 
involved. Most problems and most 
Involve the admin staff, the 
patient, the GPs involved – decide 
if the pharmacy needs to be 
involved.  
Look for areas where the system 
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possibility for improvement lie with the 
system. 
can be improved to reduce the 
risk of recurrence rather than 
blame individual error. 
One - Field expert 
involvement 
To understand how work is really 
performed it is essential to involve those 
who work on the frontline. In general 
practice this means involving frontline 
staff in both the identification and 
investigation of incidents and the design 
of change. 
Frontline staff can explain what 
happened, local context, if they 
often have to vary from protocol 
and help design changes that are 
more likely to be successful. The 
GP can explain the context in 
which the prescription was signed. 
Two – Understand 
local rationality 
Decisions are made based on ‘local 
rationality’. This means the information 
available to the person who made the 
decision with the aim of a successful 
outcome. It is important to explore this 
with frontline staff when investigating 
and learning from incidents. 
Staff can explain how this 
happened, what information was 
available to them and why it made 
sense at the time – this may be 
related to a poor telephone 
connection, noisy environment, 
interruptions, trying to complete 
many tasks at once. What 
information did the GP have? 
Three – Just 
culture 
People will not be punished when 
decisions are made in keeping with their 
training but wilful violations and gross 
negligence are not tolerated. This can aid 
learning and improvement and therefore 
accountability following incidents. 
If staff are immediately blamed, 
then they are unlikely to co-
operate and retraining or trying 
harder is likely to be 
recommended. Other learning 
about the system is less likely. If 
the GP takes the blame, then 
other learning is also not 
achieved. Human error is the 
starting point of the investigation.  
Four - Demand 
and Pressure 
Demands and pressures affect the 
performance of all staff and needs to be 
understood to understand how people 
work within the system. 
Was the demand very high that 
day? Were staff feeling under 
pressure, were they doing other 
tasks? Were GPs off – resulting in 
increased demand on GP time? 
Was the GP dealing with other 
time consuming problems? 
Five – Resources 
and Constraints 
Success depends on having the correct 
resources and appropriate constraints, 
often people have to work in situations 
where these are not available. 
Were some staff absent or had 
they been pulled away for other 
jobs? Does the phone system 
always work well? Is an answer 
machine used that stops staff 
questioning patients? Did the GP 
have time to question the request 
and information on how to reach 
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the patient? Is this routinely 
collected? 
Six – Interactions 
and Flows 
There is a need to understand the 
interactions between systems. Flow and 
interactions may not be obvious when a 
small part of the system is analysed in 
isolation. 
Were staff having to cover other 
tasks? Was the information 
passed through another staff 
member? Did all the relevant 
information get to the GP who 
signed the prescription? Did staff 
or the GP have to interrupt what 
they were doing to attend to other 
matters?  
Seven – Trade offs The use of trade-offs is ubiquitous in 
complex systems where there are 
competing goals. An example is the 
efficiency thoroughness trade-off where 
thoroughness is partially sacrificed for 
efficiency. These are used with the aim of 
achieving a good outcome. An example 
may be the prescribing of prescriptions 
without checking the medical record of 
the patient. 
Due to pressure and demand do 
staff usually have to make trade-
offs? Did the GP who signed the 
prescription make an efficiency 
thoroughness trade-off with the 
aim of ensuring good outcomes – 
ie seeing all the other patients and 
signing all the other prescriptions? 
Eight – 
performance 
variability 
In complex systems with changing 
conditions workers have to continually 
vary their performance and use 
workarounds to create successful 
outcomes. A simple example is staff 
contacting patients’ relatives in order to 
communicate a result or a required 
action. 
In what way do conditions in the 
surgery cause the staff and GPs to 
vary how they work? What 
happened in this case? Was this a 
normal performance variation? 
How did pressure, demand, 
constraints and resources lead 
staff and GPs to vary performance 
in this case? 
Nine – emergence Success and safety are emergent 
properties of systems and cannot be 
understood by breaking systems down 
into their component parts. The 
performance of the system may not be 
improved by maximising the performance 
of one small part of the system. 
Working backwards from the 
event to find the first person who 
violated from protocol will not 
increase learning about the 
system. The interactions in the 
system need to be explored and 
understood to maximise learning 
and increase the chance of 
successful improvements. 
Ten – equivalence Success and failure come from the same 
source – ordinary work. Workarounds 
and tradeoffs are used all the time to 
achieve success only occasionally do they 
lead to poor results. To improve system 
The trade-offs and performance 
variability described above usually 
lead to successful outcomes. It is 
important to explore and 
understand these so that work-as-
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functioning it is necessary to understand 
how work is done and the condition that 
require frontline staff to vary their 
performance.  
done is understood. Work-as-
imagined (and enshrined in 
protocols) may need to be altered 
to improve functioning of the 
overall system. 
 
Figure 1 – Heinrich’s Domino Model 
 
Heinrich, H.W., Industrial Accident Prevention. A Scientific Approach. Industrial Accident Prevention. 
A Scientific Approach. 1941(Second Edition).  
Figure 2 – Reason’s epidemiological model (‘Swiss – Cheese’ model) 
 
Reason J. Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 1997  
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Figure 3 - SEIPS 2.0 model 
 
 Carayon P, Hundt AS, Karsh B-T, et al. Work system design for patient safety: the SEIPS model. Qual 
Saf Health Care 2006;15:i50–8. 
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